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Introduction 
 
The past twenty years have seen an explosion of interest in positive approaches to mental 
health, happiness, and wellbeing. While these concepts vary considerably from one another, 
they share an optimistic charge and an identification of people as active subjects rather than 
passive patients. They are also characterised by a broader understanding of what constitutes 
mental health, marking a shift from the minimal definition of an absence of mental illness to a 
more expansive emphasis on optimal psychological functioning and/or a fulfilling experience 
of life (Westerhof and Keyes 2010).  
 
This focus on happiness and wellbeing acts as a bridge between global mental health and 
the broader arena of national and international policy making.  First, the promotion of 
happiness itself is seen as the proper purpose of policy.  In the UK one of the primary 
proponents of ‘happiness economics’ has thus argued strongly for greater government 
investment in mental health, and particularly Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (Layard 
2006).  Globally, the Government of Bhutan has gone furthest in seeking to incorporate 
happiness as a national development target, and spearheaded a successful move for the 
United Nations to adopt a ‘Happiness Resolution’ in 2011.  Second, subjective measures of 
wellbeing are increasingly seen as suitable indicators of wider policy success.  Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand were joined by the UK in 2011 in incorporating subjective 
measures of wellbeing in national census surveys.  The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development reported in 2013 that France, Italy, the United States, the 
Netherlands, Japan and South Korea were also either using or planning to use such 
measures. 
 
Although the positive charge of ‘wellbeing’ attracts wide-ranging assent, this is by no means 
universal. Critiques of more positive approaches to mental health are launched from both 
conservative and radical perspectives. Some distrust the breadth and ‘fuzziness’ of the 
notion of wellbeing, preferring the greater precision of clinical diagnoses of mental illness. 
Another fear is that the wide scope of ‘wellbeing’ as a focus of governmental concern – and 
supported through a plethora of voluntary and private sector organisations - legitimates an 
ever-greater intrusion of the state into the personal lives of citizens. Alternatively, concerns 
are raised that the stress on personal responsibility for positive mental health could be used 
to justify the withdrawal of state services or welfare support, or represent ideological 
pressure to say that they are ‘happy’, rather than engage in a struggle for social change. 
 
As is described later in the chapter in more detail, the dominant approaches to subjective 
dimensions of wellbeing are also subject to conceptual and methodological critique. In the 
global context, a major issue is the tendency still to consider positive mental health as a 
property of individuals. This has been criticised as reflecting a culturally – and some would 
say ideologically – specific identification of personhood.  Similarly, it has been argued that 
the character of mental health and psychological processes needs to be understood in 
relation to, rather than in abstraction from, the wider social context.  Researchers of 
wellbeing in the global south have gone further to argue that material, relational and 
subjective dimensions of ‘the good life’ are profoundly intertwined (Gough and McGregor 
2007; White, 2010).  Perspectives on wellbeing from indigenous peoples, such as the Maori 
or Australian aborigines, Adivasis in India, or so-called ‘Indios’ in Latin America, tend to be 
the most holistic, emphasising relations of moral reciprocity between human communities, 
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other forms of life, the earth, and divine powers (McCubbin et al. 2013, McGregor et al. 2003, 
Panelli and Tipa 2007, Rodriguez 2015, Wilson 2003). 
 
This chapter provides an opportunity to explore themes that are germane to the study of the 
concepts of mental health and wellbeing. We begin by sketching out some of the trajectories 
across different academic and policy fields that have contributed to the current emphasis on 
positive mental health and wellbeing. We then introduce the key concepts of ‘subjective 
wellbeing’ and ‘psychological wellbeing’ and describe some of the methods by which these 
are assessed. We consider what the two approaches have in common and how they differ. 
We then discuss some of the main criticisms that are levelled at them. The chapter closes by 
considering two very different ways that positive approaches are being pursued in policy and 
practice in the global south: psycho-social wellbeing in the context of disasters and 
humanitarian crises, and political mobilisation around notions of ‘living well’ in Latin America.  
 
 
A brief history of happiness and wellbeing studies 
 
The ubiquity of current appeals to happiness and wellbeing suggest that they reflect a range 
of different interests and cultural trends.  Within psychology, they are led by the positive 
psychology movement, launched by Martin Seligman in 1998 during his presidency of the 
American Psychological Association.  This builds on a longer history of humanistic 
psychology which includes figures such as Marie Jahoda (1958) and Abraham Maslow 
(1954), both of whom argued for a positive emphasis on mental health against the 
overwhelming preoccupation with mental illness.  In Western popular culture the emphasis 
on happiness and wellbeing chimes with the rapid expansion of counselling and 
psychotherapies, and the normalising of these as forms of life-coaching and aids to personal 
growth, rather than simply treatment to address dysfunction (e.g. Rose 1989; Illouz 2008). 
This is paralleled by a psychological and affective turn in academic social science which has 
seen a rapid expansion in the attention paid to intra-psychic processes amongst sociological, 
anthropological, and economic scholars (e.g. Connell 2005; Craib 2002; Frey 2001; 
Kahnemann 2012; Lutz 1998; Mama 2002; Moore 2007). 
 
A rather different trajectory is evident at the macro level. Here, recognition of environmental 
‘limits to growth’ (Meadows et al. 1972) has spawned re-consideration of economic models 
that identify human wellbeing with increased consumption, and suggestion of the need for 
new – or perhaps a return to older – models of human flourishing (e.g. Alkire 2002; Deneulin 
2014; Jackson 2005, Kasser 2009; Li and Xioa 2011; Martinez-Alier et al. 2010).  This has 
come together with an associated set of calls to move ‘beyond GDP’ in national and 
international measurements of economic and social progress (e.g. OECD 2013; Stiglitz et al. 
2009; Sen 1999).  It also has affinities with the ‘capability approach’ of Amartya Sen, which 
has made a major contribution to placing wellbeing on the global economics and international 
development agenda. This developed as a critique of measuring standards of living either by 
what people have (commodities) or by the pleasure or happiness they derive from these 
(utility) (Sen 1983). Instead, the concept of capability focuses on the individual and ‘the 
alternative combinations of things a person is able to be or do’ (Sen 1993: 30).  Sen counts 
the ability to be happy amongst ‘important functionings’, but resists the suggestion that being 
happy is the sole or pre-eminent purpose of human life (Sen 1993: 37). Like the 
psychological wellbeing approaches described below, he also emphasises agency and 
freedom as both prerequisites for and constituents of wellbeing.  
 
Connections looping back from macro-economic to individual measures of positive mental 
health are made by the burgeoning ‘economics of happiness’ literature.  This follows 
Easterlin’s (1974) discovery of the ‘paradox’ that, while within a given country wealthier 
people tend to report being happier, rising GDP over time in the US does not correspond with 
higher levels of happiness.  This finding has been widely and hotly contested, but an 
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incontestable outcome of the subsequent debate is that ‘happiness’ has become a serious 
topic for discussion in policy and economic communities (e.g. Deaton 2012; Dolan and White 
2007; Graham, 2012; Helliwell et al. 2013; Layard 2005; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Thin 
2012).  
 
As mentioned above, the Government of Bhutan has become the global standard-bearer for 
the promotion of ‘Gross National Happiness’ (GNH). Inspired by a throwaway comment of 
the King of Bhutan in 1972, both the idea and the measures of GNH have been re-worked 
many times, making it a truly ‘glocal’ project, seeking to meld ecological awareness and 
Bhutanese ‘wisdom’ together with standard development and Western ‘science of happiness’ 
scholarship. ‘Happiness: Towards a New Development Paradigm’ (NDP 2013) produced by 
‘an international expert working group’ for the Government of Bhutan in December 2013, 
exemplifies this mix.  Standard development concerns with living standards, health and 
education and environmental sustainability appear alongside the values of service, 
interconnectedness and co-operation.  Since ‘the inner transformation of our own mind-sets 
and behaviours is as important for happiness as the transformation of these outer conditions 
of wellbeing’ (NDP 2013: 34) it recommends in addition ‘happiness skills’ ‘drawn creatively 
from human historical experience, wisdom traditions, and modern science’ (NDP 2013: 20).  
 
The new focus on happiness and wellbeing thus draws on established traditions in 
humanistic psychology and welfare economics, but it does so with a new twist. While the 
earlier traditions were significantly philosophical and discursive, both positive psychology and 
happiness economics are positivist and empiricist in orientation, their arguments grounded in 
statistical manipulation of large datasets, with claims buttressed by appeals to ‘science’ (e.g. 
Diener 2000, Layard 2005).  As discussed later in the chapter, this has not gone 
unchallenged.  There are many questions about the robustness of the data, the limitations of 
quantitative methods, the ways happiness and wellbeing are conceptualised, and the 
ideological politics involved.   
 
 
Key concepts and methods 
 
Subjective Wellbeing - SWB 
 
In some ways the simplest notion is Subjective Wellbeing, or SWB.  This is a means of 
measuring how happy people are in and with their lives.  Amongst psychologists, SWB is 
typically conceptualised as a composite of life satisfaction, derived through ‘cognitive’ 
thought or reflective processes and ‘affect balance’ which refers to emotions or feelings. It is 
proposed that affect needs to be measured along two dimensions (positive and negative) as 
the presence of negative emotions is not equivalent simply to the absence of positive ones 
(Keyes, 2005).   
 
In economics, SWB tends to be conceptualised simply as life satisfaction.  Many more recent 
analyses (e.g. Diener et al., 2010) lead to questioning whether life satisfaction and asset 
balance should be considered together, since they behave rather differently in statistical 
tests.  Life satisfaction tends to correlate with people’s economic standard of living, affect 
balance with their social and psychological wellbeing (Graham 2012). 
 
Life satisfaction measures tend to be quite simple.  Especially in economic surveys a single 
item may be used as an indicator of ‘global happiness’. The Gallup World Poll, which is 
probably the most widely used source of international data on well being, employs just two 
items to gauge present and anticipated future life evaluations, leading to classification of 
respondents as ‘suffering’, ‘struggling’, or ‘thriving’ (Gallup, n.d.).  Diener’s widely used 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al. 1985) has five items. An alternative approach is to 
measure satisfaction across various life domains. The Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) thus 
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asks people to rate their satisfaction with their standard of living; personal health; achieving 
in life; personal relationships; personal safety; community-connectedness; future security; 
and spirituality-religion (International Wellbeing Group 2013) 
 
Measures of affect are much more diverse. These aim to rate the frequency with which 
people experience ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ emotions.1 This might involve self-assessment 
against a standard list (e.g. the PANAS scale, Watson et al. 1988).  Alternatively, 
respondents might be asked to recollect emotional experiences which are then categorised 
as positive or negative, either by themselves or others. Although at one level there is 
acceptance that this is subjective data on which the respondent must be the ultimate 
authority, there is a lingering unease with this amongst these scholars, who are 
predominantly positivist in orientation. ‘Experience-sampling’ thus aims to collect immediate 
ratings of emotions as they are experienced – respondents are buzzed or otherwise 
prompted to record what they are feeling right at that moment (e.g. Larson and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1983) to avoid the deviations of memory.  Researchers sometimes 
recommend triangulating subjective accounts with ‘objective correlates,’ such as recording 
how often people smile (Nettle 2005). Ultimately, the aspiration towards ‘science’ may lead 
towards by-passing altogether the need to engage with the subject who thinks and feels to 
express him or herself as brain imaging technologies provide ‘objective’ means to assess 
happiness (e.g. Berridge and Kringelbach 2011). 
 
The attraction of SWB is the extent to which it is parsimonious: it provides a one-off 
assessment of people’s subjective success in life.  For economists and the policy community 
it is seen to provide a direct, quantifiable measure of utility – instead of having to rely on 
income or consumption as a proxy measure of wellbeing, it is claimed, it is now possible to 
assess people’s happiness directly. Moreover, its advocates claim that it is culture-free, since 
people make their own judgements by their own criteria – there is no attempt to state what 
happiness means, but simply ‘how happy’ people are. This means, it is claimed, that SWB 
can be used to compare the net effect in terms of increased happiness across very different 
interventions, or indeed government policy as a whole.  The OECD (2013: 36) gives an 
example of this position:  
 
‘being grounded in peoples’ [sic] experiences and judgements on multiple aspects of 
their life [sic], measures of subjective well-being are uniquely placed to provide 
information on the net impact of changes in social and economic conditions on the 
perceived well-being of respondents.’  
 
In practice, there are serious doubts as to whether SWB can indeed deliver the benefits to 
policy that are claimed for it. Even if you set aside the considerable difficulty of representing 
your life through a single figure, people tend to experience such questions as asking them to 
rate themselves – a very sensitive issue.  ‘Social desirability bias’ means that people respond 
with how they would like to be perceived, rather than what they are actually feeling. SWB 
measures have also shown themselves to be very sensitive to the instruments which 
generate the data. For example, Deaton’s (2012) assessment of SWB amongst Americans 
during the economic crisis finds that a large proportion of the variability of scores from year to 
year is accounted for by changes in the order in which questions were asked. Frey and 
Gallus (2013) also point out that if SWB is adopted as an indicator of governmental success 
it will become subject to political manipulation – by both government and voters. Finally, of 
course, the ‘emptiness’ of SWB means that the link between a policy or other event and a 
rise or fall in scores is by no means transparent. 
 
 
Psychological Wellbeing - PWB 
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By contrast with SWB, proponents of Psychological Wellbeing (PWB) do focus on the 
substantive content of what constitutes positive mental health or ‘optimal psychological 
functioning’. Carol Ryff in particular seeks to re-engage the theoretical tradition of humanistic 
psychology which she sees as having been marginalised by its lack of empirical measures. 
(Ryff 1989). The starting point of PWB theorists – and the core of their objections to SWB – 
is that what makes you feel good may not necessarily be good for you.  What matters is not 
simply pleasure, but fulfilment.  They therefore critique the SWB approach for being ‘hedonic’ 
and identify themselves as ‘eudaemonic’, following in the Aristotelian tradition.   For Ryff 
(1989:1070) this is about ‘the important distinction between the gratification of right desires 
and wrong desires.’ For Ryan and Deci (2001: 146) what matters is not just pleasure but ‘the 
striving for perfection that represents the realization of one’s true potential.’ Interestingly, 
Martin Seligman (2011) has recently also come to criticise his earlier emphasis on ‘authentic 
happiness’ and endorse instead a broader ‘construct’ of ‘wellbeing’.2 
 
Ryff set out to establish a model of Psychological Wellbeing which could be empirically 
assessed across six domains (Ryff 1989; Ryff and Keyes 1995). These six domains are: self-
acceptance (a positive and acceptant attitude), purpose in life (goals and beliefs that affirm a 
sense of direction in life), autonomy (self-direction guided by socially accepted internal 
standards), positive relations with others (satisfying personal relationships), environmental 
mastery (capability to manage complex environments) and personal growth (insight into 
one’s own potential for self-development) (Ryff and Keyes 1995). 
 
By contrast, Ryan and Deci’s project was a theory of motivation, ‘Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT),’ which emphasises the psychological importance of intrinsic motivation - doing 
something for its own sake, rather than for the sake of getting some other reward.  SDT 
maintains there are three universal psychological needs: competence, autonomy, and 
relatedness. Rather than theorising psychological wellbeing directly, therefore, it is seen as 
an outcome of meeting these needs. Much of the controversy surrounding their approach 
has centred on the concept of autonomy, and whether this is genuinely a universal need, or 
one that reflects the theorists’ particular cultural location in the affluent United States. In 
response they define autonomy in opposition to heteronomy or control by others, arguing that 
this frees it from any primary association with individualism (Ryan and Deci 2011).3 Unlike 
Ryff, who is openly hostile to SWB approaches, they maintain that SWB (which they define 
as life satisfaction plus feelings of happiness) represents one possible indicator of positive 
psychological health, but only one. More importantly ‘assessments of self-actualization, 
vitality, and mental health… assess well-being conceived of as healthy, congruent and vital 
functioning’ (Ryan and Deci 2001:147) 
 
Ryff’s six domains and Ryan and Deci’s three psychological needs can be assessed in a 
number of different ways, but none has the simple portability of SWB.  By contrast, the 
‘Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale’ (WEMWBS) comprises just fourteen questions 
(or seven in the short version) about mood, energy and cognitive functioning. As a framework 
this does not have the theoretical ambitions of either Ryff and Keyes or Ryan and Deci, but 
instead comes much closer to a conventional, diagnostic understanding of mental health.  
This is perhaps not surprising given that it was developed in partnership with the Scottish 
National Health Service (Tennant et al. 2007). It does, however, manage to avoid the 
widespread tendency of health oriented frameworks to slip into negative measures which 
actually focus on mental illness.  
 
Critiques of Psychological Wellbeing concentrate largely on its cultural content.  Diener et al. 
(1998: 35) charge it with being anti-democratic, since the definition of what matters is 
determined by experts whereas SWB allows people to assess satisfaction and happiness by 
their own criteria.  Ryff’s representation of the six domains, which sets out a mini profile of 
high and low scorers is particularly vulnerable to charges of cultural bias, compared with the 
more abstract and therefore more culturally accommodating core of the SDT. Ahmed 
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(2010:12) presents instead a socio-political critique of eudaemonic approaches to wellbeing, 
that the notions of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ forms of wellbeing on which they depend are 
vulnerable to class, ethnicity and gender bias, as ‘hierarchies of happiness may correspond 
to social hierarchies.’ 
 
 
 
Critiques 
 
As presented above, there are clear and significant differences between SWB (i.e. a 
measure for assessing the subjective success of a life), and PWB (a more substantive way of 
understanding what it means for a human being to flourish). However, it is also important to 
recognise the commonalities between the concepts which derive from their shared 
disciplinary grounding in North American quantitative psychology. First, they both have an 
unquestioning commitment to a methodological and ontological individualism.  The individual 
is the unit of analysis, and the individual is psychological, affected by the material, social and 
cultural milieu but not fundamentally constituted through these.  This is typically criticised in 
terms of a cultural bias, drawing attention to the fact that people in other geographical 
locations see relationality as fundamental to personhood (e.g. Christopher 1999; Christopher 
and Hickinbottom 2008).  While there is a cultural dimension to this, it is also a disciplinary 
bias.  Qualitative sociological work approaches subjectivities of wellbeing as much more 
fluid, provisional and relational constructions, a matter, to quote Atkinson (2013), of 
‘assemblages’ rather than ‘components’.  Indeed within psychology itself, feminist writers 
such as Mama (2002) and Benjamin (1998) along with the whole tradition of psychoanalysis 
clearly contest simplistic models of personhood that are mobilised by positive psychology.  
The key issue here is whether it is such a simple thing to know and speak one’s true feelings 
or make an assessment of one’s life?    
 
Secondly, both PWB and SWB are governed by the culture and institutions of statistical 
research: disciplinary rules about the generation of data, forms of analysis and model 
validation and the reporting of results.  This builds in a conservative bias, not necessarily in 
terms of ideological politics, but in the logic of research.  For example, scales that have 
already been ‘validated’ raise fewer questions from potential reviewers and conventional 
measures allow comparison with other studies and contexts.  This betrays a structural 
commitment to universalist approaches over contextual ones: a scale ‘proves’ itself by being 
‘validated’ in multiple settings.  But the fact that people can be induced to respond to a given 
scale does not mean that it necessarily reflects anything about how they actually think about 
their lives. This construct validity can be present but relevance and meaning relatively 
absent. And the strong bias towards existing measures limits the potential for innovation and 
restricts the scope for something quite unexpected to be discovered.  
 
Thirdly, and following on from this, the dominant methods used in such research – closed 
questions or statements which are answered on a Likert scale – are highly limiting and 
disciplining to respondents. Ordinary people in most parts of the world do not live their lives 
in the general, but the particular, not in the abstract, but the concrete and embodied.  
However sensitive one seeks to be in reflecting the contexts in which lives are lived (and the 
rules of the game as set out in the previous paragraph place strict limits on this) the structure 
of these questions and their requirement to abstract from and generalise about one’s life are 
very far from the ‘natural’ way that people choose to express themselves (White and Jha 
2014).  You cannot capture the texture of the lived experience of wellbeing through a number 
on a scale of 1-10! Schwarz (1999) argues persuasively how ‘the questions shape the 
answers’ in questionnaire research, because respondents seek to pick up from the structure 
and format exactly what is required.  This raises the question as to whether the relative 
stability of SWB [Cummins (2009) reports a global norm of around 75%] might be as much a 
property of the scale – people’s choice to represent themselves as happier rather than 
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unhappier but not ecstatic – as a reflection of inner feelings.  In addition, average scores vary 
according to whether cultural norms encourage positive (ideal type North American) or 
modest (ideal type East Asian) statements about the self (Diener et al. 2000). Differences in 
average levels of response across societies might thus not tell us anything about people’s 
actual ‘happiness’, but rather social and cultural norms about the ‘presentation of self’ 
(Goffman 1959).  
 
Going one step further, it is possible to see how the fact of undertaking a survey itself is 
placing strict limits on what you can and cannot discover: you can only allow what will fit the 
categories you have pre-determined. Qualitative methods that allow people to define their 
own categories or to present their wellbeing without such prescribed classifications provide 
openings for exploring how people present their lived experiences (Camfield et al. 2009; 
White and Jha 2014) Ethnographic methods, for example, facilitate opportunities for 
researchers to gain insight into complex emic perspectives on wellbeing and mental health.  
See also chapter x by Mills and White in this Handbook.  
 
Fourthly, their commitment to the individual as unit of analysis severely limits the ability of 
these approaches to recognise the social and political. Seligman (2011:16) provides an 
extreme example of this, as with extraordinary naivety he characterises his (new) wellbeing 
theory as  
 
‘essentially a theory of uncoerced choice and its five elements comprise what free 
people will choose for their own sake.’ 
 
As the work of Lukes (1974) and many others shows, ‘choices’ are never completely ‘free’ 
but reflect values, preferences and opportunities all of which are shaped and made available 
or unavailable to different kinds of people through complex social and political processes.  
The social and political context also constructs differential aspirations and feelings of 
satisfaction or acceptance (Appadurai 2004). High scores may reflect the low expectations of 
internalised oppression, rather than genuinely positive experience.  This also affects the 
ratings of the same  individuals over time. The use of subjective measures in policy 
evaluation is bedevilled by ‘adaptation’ – the way that expectations shift with experience.   
 
Choice is also foundational to SDT through its stress on autonomy:  
 
‘Autonomous self-regulation is central in allowing the individual to choose and most 
fully develop preferred ways of being, and in doing so to satisfy basic psychological 
needs which in turn lead to vitality and happiness’ (Ryan and Deci 2011:45). 
 
The importance of a sense of autonomy or personal agency to wellbeing is not in doubt. The 
issue is how this is conceived.  Devine et al. (2006) consider whether autonomy emerges as 
significant to wellbeing in various pieces of research in Bangladesh, as an example of an 
environment which is poor in material resources but relationally dense and rich.  They find 
that autonomy is important, but suggest that this is expressed through:   
 
‘a complex array of situated autonomies that embrace a wide range of covert as well 
as overt behaviour patterns, decisions, and actions’ (Devine et al. 2006:28). 
 
Importantly, they go beyond the individual to argue: 
 
‘autonomy is determined not only by the agential capacities of an individual but also 
by the nature of relationships he or she may enjoy with others.’ (Devine et al. 
2006:28) 
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Underlying all of this are epistemological questions about whether any approach to wellbeing 
can serve across all contexts, and ontological questions about the role of culture in the 
formation of personhood.  Such questions apply, of course, to all characterisations of mental 
health or illness which claim to be universal. Obeyesekere (1985:134) poses the problem 
neatly:  
  
‘Faced with generalised feelings of loss and sense of hopelessness labelled 
depression in the USA, in Sri Lanka [we] would say that we are not dealing with a 
depressive but a good Buddhist.’ 
 
Similarly, Fernando (2012) recounts her encounter with a Tamil woman who had been 
tortured by the Sri Lankan military. Her lack of distress was interpreted by Fernando to be the 
process of psychological denial. When asked what the torture experience meant to her the 
woman replied: ‘Well, I am really looking forward to my next life. I must have done some 
terrible things to have deserved this horrible suffering. I now that in my next birth I will have 
the most wonderful life. This knowledge makes me happy’ (Fernando 2012: 397). Constructs 
of the experience and meaning of distress and mental health and illness cannot be 
understood through a universalist framework but are instead intertwined with context, culture 
and beliefs of people and societies.  
 
While theorists of psychological wellbeing may recognise the importance of the social, 
material, cultural and political environment in promoting, supporting, or undermining 
autonomy, this is conceived as an external relationship, in the mode of ‘the social 
determinants of health.’  Such a framing cannot capture the ways that constructions of 
wellbeing or happiness are themselves implicated in relations of power. And yet this is critical 
if we are to understand what people are saying as they respond to the questionnaires.  As 
Ahmed (2010: 5) points out, the context of happiness research is anything but neutral. If 
happiness is what everyone wants, then to be asked how happy you are is a very loaded 
question. Furthermore, if analysis centres on the individual, where is the space to consider  
 
‘feminist critiques of the figure of “the happy housewife,” black critiques of the myth of 
“the happy slave,” and queer critiques of the sentimentalization of heterosexuality as 
“domestic bliss”  ….which expose the unhappy effects of happiness, teaching us how 
happiness is used to redescribe social norms as social goods.’ (Ahmed, 2010:2) 
 
The ideological character of the promotion of happiness is similarly criticised by Held (2002) 
who talks of the ‘tyranny’ of the positive attitude and Ehrenreich (2009) amongst many 
others. Fernando (2012), in his reflection on the global mental health (GMH) research 
agenda, makes a different kind of critique as she questions who benefits from the focus on 
the suffering of communities in ‘low-power’ countries such as Sri Lanka: GMH researchers 
and their institutions benefit, journals who publish the findings, the research community as a 
whole and the funders gain from the research. Notably less obvious is the benefit that 
participating communities themselves derive from these large scale research studies on 
mental health and wellbeing, and Fernando argues that community benefit and wellbeing is 
as important as individual benefit.  
 
Psycho-social wellbeing 
 
Having considered the two dominant framings of wellbeing, both of which ultimately rely on 
abstracting the individual from his or her social context, we now turn to approaches which 
seek to develop a more collective and contextual approach. We consider first psycho-social 
wellbeing, particularly in the context of international development, humanitarian, and post-
disaster rehabilitation. We then look at Latin American approaches to promote buen vivir, 
‘living well’. 
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The first psycho-social approach we introduce here is called ‘inner wellbeing’, developed 
through research in India and Zambia (White et al. 2014; www.wellbeingpathways.org).  This 
began with the definition: ‘Wellbeing is experienced when people have what they need for life 
to be good.’ This places subjectivity at the centre, linking together experience, resources, 
needs and evaluation.  It is phrased in collective terms, but is also open to individual 
interpretation.  The research aimed to explore the interplay between the experience of 
wellbeing and the external conditions in which people live their lives.  Within this general 
approach, the psycho-social conception of wellbeing is termed ‘inner wellbeing’, which is 
defined as ‘what people think and feel they are able to be and do.’ Inner wellbeing is a 
domain-based model, comprising seven inter-related domains.4  Its psychosocial orientation 
means that it emphasises people’s grounding in and interaction with a particular social and 
cultural context, rather than internal psychological processes.  
 
Whereas the concept of inner wellbeing was developed through an academic research 
project, an operational approach to psychosocial wellbeing has also been constructed as an 
alternative to mental health responses to humanitarian emergencies. Mental health 
approaches – which were dominant in humanitarian aid circles for several decades – are 
associated with a biomedical and psychiatric orientation to understanding the impact of 
conflict on people (Pupavac, 2006). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) scales became 
a common means of assessing the impact of distress on populations and interventions were 
based on Western psychological and psychiatric theory and practice. Known as ‘the trauma 
discourse’ and associated with an orientation towards identifying disorders (PTSD, 
depression, anxiety) and vulnerability, the approach was criticised for imposing an alien view 
of mental health on people who were not asked about how they understood and identified 
their own wellbeing needs and priorities (Summerfield, 1999). This clinical approach to 
providing mental health services was seen as being culturally insensitive and largely 
contextually irrelevant for affected populations. It was partially in response to this that groups 
of practitioners and academics developed an alternative conceptualisation focused on 
psychosocial wellbeing (Psychosocial Working Group, 2003). The main differences between 
the trauma and the psychosocial approaches were that the latter aims to be holistic in its 
understanding of the emotional, social, physical, material, spiritual and political needs of 
affected populations. Psychosocial wellbeing was understood to be related to three domains: 
firstly human capacity, secondly social ecology, and thirdly culture and values. Any initiative 
aimed at improving any of these three spheres could thus be seen as a psychosocial 
intervention (Psychosocial Working Group, 1998). For example, the exhuming of mass 
graves, forming a knitting group, working with a community to establish a football field could 
all be seen as activities that improve psychosocial wellbeing. This ‘anything goes’ approach 
was criticised by trauma-oriented professionals some of whom maintained the need for 
training and supervision of counsellors and therapists as the appropriate provision of mental 
health services (Hubbard & Pearson, 2006). A further distinguishing feature of the 
psychosocial wellbeing approach is the emphasis on the material and socio-economic 
aspects of wellbeing, on the basis that it may be difficult to discuss emotions when you are 
thinking about how to feed your hungry children that evening. The focus on the intra-psychic 
as separate and disconnected from the rest of life (physical, material, social) is criticised as 
an artificial and theoretical distinction that has little relevance to how people think of their 
lives (Miller and Rasmussen 2009). 
 
The development of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental 
Health and Psychosocial Support (2007) have contributed to a reduction in the tensions 
between the psychosocial and psychiatric paradigms by establishing the contributions that 
each can make for different segments of the population. The IASC interventions pyramid 
describes different levels and types of service provisions that fulfil functions for various 
groups of the population:  the majority of people cope with their experiences without the need 
for additional interventions if security, basic service provision and local forms of support are 
re-established. A small minority who are suffering from mental illness need to receive 
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specialised psychological or biomedical treatment. The rest of the population falls 
somewhere between these two ends of the continuum and may benefit from focused, non-
specialised assistance in the form of support groups, psychoeducation, or various forms of 
psychosocial training (Wessells & van Ommeren, 2008). Mental health and Psychosocial 
Support (MHPSS) has now come an established way to refer to the whole field. 
Commentators have however highlighted persisting tensions that can emerge when a 
disaster or emergency situation has occurred and the MHPSS ‘circus’ is mobilised (Pupavac, 
2006).  
 
Partly in reaction to the perceived conservatism of subjective wellbeing, psychosocial 
wellbeing has positioned itself at the progressive end of the continuum with the potential to 
be oriented towards accountable service provision. Its proponents have often situated 
themselves within a political and human rights agenda that sees its role as supporting 
people’s own initiatives at rebuilding their lives. This, of course, does not mean that the 
potential is always realised; however, the discourse and the possibilities it creates allow for 
context, local agendas and power issues to be brought to the fore of discussions about the 
appropriateness of mental health interventions in emergency settings. It also bears some 
resemblance to recent initiatives for recovery from mental illness to be defined by the 
service-users themselves rather than having this defined by clinical and medical staff on their 
behalf (see chapter xx of this book on recovery approaches).  
 
Popular Mobilisation for Wellbeing: Buen Vivir in Latin America 
 
All the approaches reviewed so far have been developed ‘top down’ by academics or 
professionals. By contrast, in Latin America alternative conceptions of what it means to live 
well have been the focus of grass-roots mobilisation from ‘bottom up’.5  These combine an 
emphasis on social and economic rights with the cosmologies of specific indigenous peoples, 
which tend to emphasise oneness, with humanity as part of nature and social relations 
intertwined with environmental relations. They also tend to be systemic or cyclical in 
orientation, rather than linear, to emphasise reciprocity, and to emphasise place and 
particularity rather than aspiring for ‘global’ universality. 
 
‘Living well, is life in plenitude. Knowing to live in harmony and equilibrium; in harmony with 
the cycles of mother earth, the cosmos, life and history, and equilibrium with all life forms in 
permanent respect.’ (Mamani 2010, in Rodriguez, 2013)6 
 
Translated as ‘living well together’7 these representations of indigenous ideologies have had 
a major effect in giving form to rights-based struggles against the dominance of traditional 
political elites, the United States, and neo-liberal capitalism, especially in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, where they have been incorporated into new national constitutions.  The result is a 
new emphasis on the claims of the natural world and environmental sustainability, the need 
for redistribution and expanded state welfare provision, and the collective rights of 
marginalised peoples to inclusion within a state that recognises within it the equal rights of a 
plurality of cultures and nations (Radcliffe 2011).  Rodriguez (2013) presents the components 
of Ecuador’s plan for Buen Vivir (2009-2013).  These comprise rights to the satisfaction of 
human needs; quality of life; dignified death; to love and be loved; healthy development of all 
in harmony with nature; indefinite prolongation of cultures; free time for contemplation; and 
the emancipation and widening of liberties, capabilities and potentialities.  
 
While the theory is attractive, the practice is more difficult.  In reality, both Ecuador and 
Bolivia remain heavily dependent on mining, oil or gas extraction with high environmental 
costs.  Views of what it means to ‘live well together’ vary both between and within indigenous 
groups (Artaraz and Calestani 2014, Loera Gonzalez 2015, Rodriquez 2015).  There are 
serious conflicts of interest between different geographical and occupational groups, and 
between environmental protection and the financing of social welfare or the provision of 
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water and sanitation to the urban poor (Fabricant 2013). There are also international 
dimensions.  For any country it is a challenge to implement a radically different economic 
model given people’s pressing needs, the daily politics of reforming state structures and the 
need to engage with global economic structures and relationships (Radcliffe 2011). 
 
For some readers, we suspect, this direct engagement with politics seems a long way from 
global mental health.  As other chapters in this volume make clear, however, global mental 
health is a political issue.  In addition, at least in their core visions, buen vivir approaches 
represent a holistic approach to wellbeing that specifically resists the separations of mind, 
body, spirit; human and non-human; personal and political that all of the other approaches 
that we have reviewed are prey to.  It also draws attention to the importance of communities 
being able to negotiate and work with their own cultural conceptions of what living well 
means, rather than having an external, perhaps medicalized, model imposed upon them. 
While it is clearly much more than this, we would argue that Buen Vivir constitutes an 
extraordinarily inclusive vision for positive mental health.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed some of the important recent developments in positive 
approaches to mental health, happiness, and wellbeing. While we generally welcome the 
positive emphasis and recognition of people as active agents within their own lives, we also 
sound some notes of caution.  In particular, we are concerned by the dominance of 
quantitative assessment in this area, which seems ironic given its overwhelming emphasis 
on subjective perspectives and the quality of life. The limitations of quantitative approaches 
are particularly clear when they are used in societies other than those in which they were 
designed, since they inevitably reproduce their own categories, and are unable to recognise 
understandings of the world that are different to their own.  Researchers in non-metropolitan 
contexts and at the more critical end of the mental health/psychosocial wellbeing paradigm in 
particular question the separation of psychological from social, and indeed of the 
psychological from the relational and material.  Advancing positive mental health requires 
that we restore these connections and re-balance our research agendas so that the 
complexity of subjectivity and lives lived with others becomes the centre, rather than the 
periphery, of our vision. 
 
Notes 
                                               
1 Whether it is useful to characterize emotions as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is itself open to debate, of 
course.  
2 Seligman (2011:12) characterises wellbeing as a construct made up of: positive emotion, 
engagement, positive relationships, meaning, and accomplishment.  
3 See Miller (2002) for a helpful discussion of the individualism/collectivism binary that has dominated 
cross-cultural psychology. 
4 The inner wellbeing domains are: economic confidence; agency and participation; social 
connections; close relationships; physical and mental health; competence and self-worth; values and 
meaning. 
5 Buen vivir is the Spanish term for ‘living well’. Alternative terms are also used, which express allied 
concepts in indigenous languages. 
6 Fernando Huanacuni Mamani (2010). ‘Buen Vivir / Vivir Bien Filosofía, políticas, estrategias y 
experiencias regionales andinas’  
7 Buen vivir is the Spanish term.  Other terms in indigenous languages include suma qamaña 
(Aymara) and sumac kawsay (Quechua). 
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